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Abstract 
Norwegian distribution companies have been subjected to an incentive regulation 
scheme from 1997, and the efficiency incentives were further strengthened with the 
introduction of yardstick regulation in 2007. We examine the productivity development 
for these companies in the period from 2004 to 2013. Using three benchmarking 
methods, DEA, SFA, and StoNED, we examine productivity change, with the usual 
decompositions into efficiency change, technical change, and scale efficiency change. 
Increasing investments and use of accounting-based capital costs in our analysis may 
lead to a negative bias in the productivity change estimates, and we therefore perform 
our analysis with and without capital costs. Our results indicate a negative productivity 
development for the whole period from 2004 to 2013, and we do not observe a positive 
effect of the change in regulation regime from 2007. 
  
 
 
1 Introduction 
With electricity sector reforms in the 1990s, the structure, organization, and 
operating environment for the electricity sector in many countries experienced great 
change. The central objectives of the reforms were to implement market 
competition in electricity generation and supply sectors, and to improve the 
efficiency or productivity of the natural monopoly activities of distribution and 
transmission through suitable regulatory schemes. In this paper we focus on the 
electricity distribution companies. 
The aim of the regulatory reforms is to provide the distribution companies with 
incentives to improve their investment and operating efficiency and to ensure that 
consumers benefit from the efficiency gains. Regulators have therefore adopted a 
variety of approaches to incentive regulation, including rate-of-return (ROR), cost-of-
service (COS) regulation, and so on. The most widely used incentive schemes are 
based on price cap, revenue cap, and yardstick regulation. In practice, many regulators 
implement these incentive regimes with different benchmarking methods. Within this 
context, the standard definition of benchmarking is a comparison of some measure of 
actual performance against a reference performance. The common way of obtaining a 
comprehensive benchmarking is to establish production or cost frontiers for the 
companies, and then to estimate the performance of individual companies based on the 
corresponding frontier. 
In Norway, the Energy Act of 1990, in force from 1991, introduced a regulatory reform 
of the Norwegian electricity market. The reform laid the ground rules for competition 
in the supply sector and regulation in transmission and distribution sectors. In 1997, the 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) implemented an incentive 
regulation scheme with revenue caps that were updated every 5 years based on Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). From 2007, the incentives were strengthened in a 
yardstick regulation scheme with annual updates of the revenue caps. See Bjørndal et 
al. (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the various regulation schemes that have 
been used. Amundsveen and Kvile (2014) discusses the present yardstick regulation. 
There are several different approaches to measure the relative efficiency and 
productivity of companies in relation to a sample’s efficient frontier (Jamasb and Pollit, 
2001). These approaches are generally placed into two broad categories: non-
 
 
parametric and parametric techniques. DEA (Charnes et al., 1978; Farrell, 1957) is a 
non-parametric method that is capable of handling multiple inputs and multiple outputs, 
while stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Aigner et al., 1977) and corrected ordinary 
least squares (COLS) (Richmond, 1974) are parametric methods. Lately, a semi-
nonparametric approach has been proposed, i.e. stochastic semi-parametric 
envelopment of data, or StoNED (Kuosmanen and Kortelainen, 2012), and this method 
has been used for regulation of Finnish distribution companies (Kuosmanen, 2012). 
We use the StoNED method to examine the productivity performance for Norwegian 
electricity distribution companies, and we compare the StoNED results to estimates 
based on DEA and SFA. Our analysis is based on a sample of 123 distribution 
companies for the period 2004-2013. We also decompose the respective productivity 
indices, and we discuss efficiency change, technical change and scale efficiency 
change for the companies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First we review previous productivity 
studies of electricity distribution in Norway and other countries in Section 2. The 
necessary methodology, i.e. Malmquist, DEA, SFA, and StoNED, is introduced in 
Section 3. The data and the empirical results are described in Sections 4 and 5, 
respectively, and we conclude in Section 6. 
2 Previous studies 
Hjalmarsson and Veiderplass (1992) applied DEA to investigate productivity 
development of electricity distribution in Sweden between 1970 and 1986. They found 
a high rate (5%) of productivity growth, due to economies of density, over a period 17 
years. Giannakis et al. (2003) studied technical efficiency and productivity change for 
electricity distribution companies in the United Kingdom for the period 1991/92 to 
1998/99 using the DEA approach. Their analysis indicated significant productivity 
growth, and the gains could be attributed to reduced efficiency gap among the 
companies, frontier shift, and improved quality of service. Pombo and Taborda (2006) 
did a DEA-based Malmquist productivity study of Colombia’s electricity distribution 
companies for the period 1985 to 2001, and they found that the largest companies 
experienced increasing productivity, due to frontier shift after the reform in 1994. 
Nakano and Managi (2008) estimated the Luenberger productivity indicator using 
DEA and dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) for Japanese electricity 
 
 
distribution companies over the period 1978–2003. They found a positive productivity 
effect of the regulatory reforms, mainly due to technological change. Pérez-Reyes and 
Tovar (2009) applied DEA to study productivity development of electricity distribution 
companies in Peru over the period 1996-2006. They found an annual average 
productivity growth of 4.3%, and most of this growth was due to technological change. 
Ramos-Real et al. (2009), using DEA, found an annual productivity growth of 1.3% for 
Brazilian electricity distribution companies from 1998 to 2005, and they concluded 
that technological change was the main cause of growth. 
Førsund and Kittelsen (1998) used DEA to study productivity development of 
Norwegian distribution companies between the two years 1983 and 1989. They found 
positive growth of almost 2% per year on average, and the growth was mostly due to 
technological change. Edvardsen et al. (2006) used DEA to study productivity change 
of Norwegian electricity distribution companies over the period 1996-2003. They 
found an annual productivity increase of 1.1%, which was driven by both efficiency 
change and technological change. Migueís et al. (2011) used DEA to examine 
productivity change for Norwegian electricity distribution companies between 2004 
and 2007, and they included environmental factors as output variables with restricted 
virtual weights. Their study found almost 0.3% annual productivity growth, mostly due 
to technological change. They also identified innovator firms, i.e., firms that 
contributed to positive frontier shifts. 
3 Methodology 
 
3.1 The Malmquist productivity index and its decompositions 
The concept of the Malmquist productivity index originated from Caves et al. (1982a). 
In order to define it we need to specify the production technology as 
ܲ௧ሺ࢟௧ሻ ൌ ሼ࢞௧:	࢞௧	can	produce	࢟௧ሽ,                                          (1) 
where ࢞௧ and ࢟௧ represent the input vector and output vector at each time period ݐ, ݐ ൌ
1,⋯ , ܶ, respectively. The set ܲ௧ሺ࢟௧ሻ is assumed to be non-empty, closed, convex and 
bounded. It satisfies strong disposability of inputs and outputs, and also contains all 
input vectors that can produce output ࢟௧. A functional representation of the technology 
is constructed by Shephard's (1970) input distance function 
ܦ௧ሺ࢟௧, ࢞௧ሻ ൌ supሼ߮: ሺ࢞௧/߮ሻ ∈ ܲ௧ሺ࢟௧ሻ, ߮ ൐ 0ሽ.                             (2) 
 
 
The function ܦ௧ሺ࢟௧, ࢞௧ሻ represents the maximum proportional contraction of inputs 
given outputs at each period	ݐ. ܦ௧ሺ࢟௧, ࢞௧ሻ is defined in terms of period ݐ dataset and 
technology, and adjacent-period input distances using period ݐ or ݐ ൅ 1 data and period 
ݐ ൅ 1 or ݐ technology are defined as 
ܦ௧ାଵሺ࢟௧, ࢞௧ሻ ൌ supሼ߮: ሺ࢞௧/߮ሻ ∈ ܲ௧ାଵሺ࢟௧ሻ, ߮ ൐ 0ሽ                           (3) 
and 
ܦ௧ሺ࢟௧ାଵ, ࢞௧ାଵሻ ൌ supሼ߮: ሺ࢞௧ାଵ/߮ሻ ∈ ܲ௧ሺ࢟௧ାଵሻ, ߮ ൐ 0ሽ,                       (4) 
respectively (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1995). 
Following Färe and Primont (1995), the input distance function ܦ௧ሺ࢟௧, ࢞௧ሻ is reciprocal 
to Farrell’s input oriented measure of efficiency, which is 
ܧ௧ሺ࢟௧, ࢞௧ሻ ൌ minሼߠ: ሺߠ࢞௧ሻ ∈ ܲ௧ሺ࢟௧ሻ, ߠ ൐ 0ሽ.                                  (5) 
The efficiencies for the adjacent-period input distance functions can be obtained as  
ܧ௧ାଵሺ࢟௧, ࢞௧ሻ ൌ minሼߠ: ሺߠ࢞௧ሻ ∈ ܲ௧ାଵሺ࢟௧ሻ, ߠ ൐ 0ሽ                                (6) 
and 
ܧ௧ሺ࢟௧ାଵ, ࢞௧ାଵሻ ൌ minሼߠ: ሺߠ࢞௧ାଵሻ ∈ ܲ௧ሺ࢟௧ାଵሻ, ߠ ൐ 0ሽ.                           (7) 
The Malmquist productivity index between period ݐ and ݐ ൅ 1 can be expressed as 
ܯܲܫሺ࢟௧, ࢞௧, ࢟௧ାଵ, ࢞௧ାଵሻ ൌ ቂா೎ೝೞ೟ ൫࢟೟శభ,࢞೟శభ൯ா೎ೝೞ೟ ሺ࢟೟,࢞೟ሻ
ா೎ೝೞ೟శభ൫࢟೟శభ,࢞೟శభ൯
ா೎ೝೞ೟శభሺ࢟೟,࢞೟ሻ ቃ
భ
మ ൌ ܧܥ ⋅ ܶܥ ⋅ ܵܧܥ,          (8) 
where ܧ௖௥௦௧   is the efficiency under constant returns to scale (CRS). Equation (8) also 
shows that the productivity index can be decomposed into efficiency change (EC), 
technical change (TC) and scale efficiency change (SEC) (Ray and Desli, 1997). We 
define ܧ௩௥௦௧  as efficiency under variable returns to scale (VRS), as well as 
ܧܥ ൌ ாೡೝೞ೟శభ൫࢟೟శభ,࢞೟శభ൯ாೡೝೞ೟ ሺ࢟೟,࢞೟ሻ ,                                                                 (9) 
ܶܥ ൌ ቂாೡೝೞ೟ ൫࢟೟శభ,࢞೟శభ൯ாೡೝೞ೟శభሺ࢟೟శభ,࢞೟శభሻ
ாೡೝೞ೟ ൫࢟೟,࢞೟൯
ாೡೝೞ೟శభሺ࢟೟,࢞೟ሻቃ
భ
మ, and                                    (10) 
ܵܧܥ ൌ ቎
ಶ೎ೝೞ೟ ൫࢟೟శభ,࢞೟శభ൯
ಶೡೝೞ೟ ൫࢟೟శభ,࢞೟శభ൯
ಶ೎ೝೞ೟ ൫࢟೟,࢞೟൯
ಶೡೝೞ೟ ൫࢟೟,࢞೟൯
ಶ೎ೝೞ೟శభ൫࢟೟శభ,࢞೟శభ൯
ಶೡೝೞ೟శభ൫࢟೟శభ,࢞೟శభ൯
ಶ೎ೝೞ೟శభ൫࢟೟,࢞೟൯
ಶೡೝೞ೟శభ൫࢟೟,࢞೟൯
቏
భ
మ
.                                      (11) 
3.2 Impact of environmental factors 
The performance of electricity distribution companies are typically affected by 
environmental factors that are beyond the companies’ control, such as differences in 
weather conditions or topology. In order to account for the environmental impact in a 
 
 
comparable manner under our three methodological approaches, as described in 
Sections 3.3-3.5 below, we follow the procedure suggested by Barnum and Gleason 
(2008). In an output-oriented benchmarking model, they suggest accounting for the 
effect of the environment on output via a regression where output is regressed on both 
inputs and environmental variables. Then the effect of environmental variables is 
removed from the observed output and the new adjusted value of output is obtained, 
and the benchmarking exercise can be done with the new adjusted data. In our input-
oriented application we use the following model to regress the endogenous input (total 
cost) on the outputs and the environmental variables: 
log	ሺ࢞௜ሻ ൌ ߱௜ ൅ ࣋௜log	ሺ࢟௜ሻ ൅ ࢾ࢏ࢠ௜ ൅ ߳௜,						݅ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊                    (12) 
In this equation, ݔ௜ is the single input, ࢟࢏ is the output vector, and ࢠ௜ is the vector of 
environmental factors, of company ݅ . The vector ࢾ࢏  contains the coefficients 
representing the environmental impact on the total cost of company ݅. Also, ࣋௜ is the 
vector of output coefficients, ߱௜ is the intercept, and ߳௜ is the statistical error term, for 
company ݅. We then adjust the total cost by removing the estimated environmental 
impact as follows 
ݔ௜௔ௗ௝௨௦௧ ൌ ݔ௜ ⋅ exp	ሺെࢾ࢏ࢠ௜ሻ,                                                              (13) 
and the adjusted cost ݔ௜௔ௗ௝௨௦௧  is used as input variable in the benchmarking models 
described in the next three subsections.  
3.3 DEA frontier 
DEA is an axiomatic, non-parametric approach to calculate the efficient or best-
practice frontier of a sample (Farrell, 1957; Charnes et al., 1978). It employs a 
piecewise linear frontier production (cost) function to estimate performance of the 
sample companies. The frontier envelops the data as tightly as possible, and observed 
companies, termed best practice, will form the benchmarking technology. DEA models 
can be input-oriented or output-oriented, and they can be specified with constant 
returns to scale (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). We use the input-oriented 
model to examine the performance of electricity distribution companies, since the 
objective of a distribution company is, typically, to produce exogenously given output 
quantities at minimum cost. 
 
 
Under the CRS assumption, the efficiency score ܧ௜௧	ሺ࢞௜௧ାଵ, ࢟௜௧ାଵሻ  for company ݅  in 
period ݐ ൅ 1 relative to the technology in period ݐ is the optimal value of  
minఏ,ࣅ ߠ 
 s.t. 
              െ࢟௜௧ାଵ +	ࢅ௧ࣅ	 ൒ 0                                  i ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊; ݐ ൌ 1,⋯ , ܶ            
 ߠ࢞௜௧ାଵ െ ࢄ௧ࣅ	 ൒ 0                                  i ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊; ݐ ൌ 1,⋯,                (14)                
                   ࣅ	 ൒ 0.                                                          
Here, ߠ represents the efficiency score,  ࣅ is a non-negative ݊ ൈ 1 vector of reference 
weights, and ࢞௜௧ and ࢟௜௧ represent the input and output column vectors, respectively, of 
company ݅  in period ݐ . The ݉ ൈ ݊  matrix ࢄ௧  and the ݎ ൈ ݊		matrix ࢅ௧ represent ݉ 
inputs and ݎ outputs, respectively, for ݊ companies in period ݐ. Similarly, we obtain 
ܧ௜௧ାଵሺ࢞௜௧, ࢟௜௧ሻ as the optimal value of (14), when  ࢄ௧  and ࢅ௧  is replaced by ࢄ௧ାଵ and 
ࢅ௧ାଵ, respectively, and ࢞௜௧ାଵ and ࢟௜௧ାଵ is replaced by ࢞௜௧ and ࢟௜௧, respectively. To obtain 
efficiency scores under the VRS assumption, the convexity constraint ∑ࣅ ൌ 1 has to 
be added.  Combining variations of Model (14) with Equations (8)-(11), we obtain the 
productivity index and its decompositions, i.e., ܯܲܫ௜ௗ௘௔, ܧܥ௜ௗ௘௔, ܶܥ௜ௗ௘௔, ܵܧܥ௜ௗ௘௔. 
3.4 SFA frontier 
In this study, the SFA approach by Pantzios et al. (2011) is used to implement the 
input-oriented Malmquist productivity index. Based on Section 3.1, the input-oriented 
Malmquist productivity index based on the SFA approach is defined as1	 
ܯܲܫ௜௦௙௔ሺ࢟௜௧, ࢟௜௧ାଵ, ݔ௜௧, ݔ௜௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܧܥ௜௦௙௔ ⋅ ܶܥ௜௦௙௔ ⋅ ܵܧܥ௜௦௙௔.                       (15) 
The estimation of this parametric Malmquist productivity index requires specification 
and estimation of the input distance function (IDF), D. This IDF can be specified and 
estimated in several ways (see, e.g., Kumbhakar et al., 2015). Since we use panel data, 
a panel data estimator is a natural choice. Here we use the state-of-the art stochastic 
frontier panel data model by Colombi et al. (2014) and Kumbhakar et al. (2014). In this 
model the error term (of the regression equation) is split into four components. The 
first component captures firms’ latent heterogeneity, which is disentangled from long-
                                                 
1 The decomposition of Pantzios et al. (2011) included also an additional component, the input-mix 
effect. That component dropped out in this study, since the data set only includes one input. 
 
 
run (persistent) inefficiency, and the second component captures short-run (time-
varying) inefficiency. The third component captures long-run (persistent) inefficiency, 
while the last component captures random shocks. With panel data and a translog 
function within an input distance function framework the estimation equation looks 
like2 
              െlnݔ௜௧ ൌ lnܦሺ࢟௜௧ሻ ൅ ߤ௜ െ ݑ௜ ൅ ݒ௜௧ െ ߬௜௧ 
                        	ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ௟lnݕ௟௜௧௥௟ୀଵ ൅ ଵଶ∑ ∑ ߚ௟௤lnݕ௟௜௧ lnݕ௤௜௧௥௤ୀଵ௥௟ୀଵ ൅ ߙ௧ݐ ൅
ଵ
ଶ ߙ௧௧ݐଶ ൅	 
	                            ∑ ߚ௟௧௥௟ୀଵ lnݕ௟௜௧ ݐ ൅ ߤ௜ െ ݑ௜ ൅ ݒ௜௧ െ ߬௜௧,	  
                ݅ ൌ 1,⋯⋯ , ݊; ݈ ൌ 1,⋯⋯ , ݎ; ݍ ൌ 1,⋯⋯ , ݎ,                                            (16) 
where lnݔ௜௧ ൌ lnሺTotal	costሻ	(see the data section below) for company ݅ in period ݐ, ݕ௟௜௧  
is output ݈  for company ݅  in period ݐ  and ߙ  and ߚ  are unknown parameters to be 
estimated. The symmetry restrictions imply that ߚ௟௤ ൌ ߚ௤௟ . In this model, ݒ௜௧  is the 
idiosyncratic noise component capturing random shocks, ߬௜௧  is the time-varying 
stochastic inefficiency capturing short-run inefficiency effects, ݑ௜ is the time-invariant 
(long-run) inefficiency and ߤ௜ is unconstrained and treated as firm effects. 
We compute the first component in Equation (15), efficiency change, using 
ܧܥ௜௦௙௔ ൌ ܧ௜௧ାଵ െ ܧ௜௧,                                                   (17) 
where E ቂexpቀെ߬௜௧|ሺݒ௜௧ െ ߬௜௧ሻቁቃ  is used to estimate (technical) efficiency, ܧ௜௧ 
(Kumbhakar et al., 2015). Note that with the estimation approach in equation (15), 
short-run and long-run efficiency is disentangled, and it is only the short-run efficiency 
measure that influences the efficiency change measure.	 
Technical change is a product of the technical change magnitude index and the output 
bias index:	 
               ܶܥ௜௦௙௔ ൌ ஽
೟శభ൫࢟೔೟శభ,௫೔೟శభ൯
஽೟൫࢟೔೟శభ,௫೔೟శభ൯
ൌ ൤஽೟శభ൫࢟೔೟,௫೔೟൯஽೟൫࢟೔೟,௫೔೟൯ ൨ ൈ ൤
஽೟శభ൫࢟೔೟శభ,௫೔೟శభ൯
஽೟൫࢟೔೟శభ,௫೔೟శభ൯
ൈ ஽೟൫࢟೔೟,௫೔೟൯஽೟శభ൫࢟೔೟,௫೔೟൯൨       
       ൌ ሾߙ௧ ൅ ߙ௧௧ݐ ൅ ∑ ߚ௟௧௥௟ୀଵ lnݕ௟௜௧ ሿ ൈ ሾ∑ ߚ௟௧௥௟ୀଵ ሺlnݕ௟௜௧ାଵ െ lnݕ௟௜௧ ሻሿ.       (18) 
                                                 
2 The estimator in this study is implemented using the maximum simulated likelihood estimator 
approach by Filippini and Greene (2015), as it is included in the statistical software Limdep 
(http://www.limdep.com/). 
 
 
The scale efficiency measure in Equation (15) is calculated as 
ܵܧܥ௜௦௙௔ ൌ	
exp
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In Equation (19) the డ୪୬஽೟൫࢟೔೟శభ,௫೔೟൯డ୪୬௬೗೔೟శభ  function is ∑ ߚ௟௤lnݕ௤௜
௧ାଵ௥௟ୀଵ ൅ ߚ௟௧ሺݐ ൅ 1ሻ , and the 
డ୪୬஽೟൫࢟೔೟,௫೔೟൯
డ୪୬௬೗೔೟
 function is ߚ௟ ൅ ∑ ߚ௟௤lnݕ௤௜௧௥௟ୀଵ ൅ ߚ௟௧ሺݐሻ. 
Note that with this SFA frontier approach we separate both firm heterogeneity and 
noise while estimating inefficiency. Furthermore, this approach separates persistent 
and transient inefficiency. It is expected that these aspects also influence the empirical 
results. 
3.5 StoNED frontier 
The StoNED combines non-parametric, piece-wise linear DEA-style frontiers with the 
stochastic SFA-style treatment of inefficiency and noise. Kuosmanen and Kortelainen 
(2012) found that both the DEA and SFA models can be obtained as constrained 
special cases of the more general StoNED model.  
A two-step strategy is used for the StoNED model: 
Step 1: Estimate the shape of the total cost function using the convex nonparametric 
least squares (CNLS) approach. 
Step 2: Impose additional distributional assumptions on inefficiency and noise, and 
estimate the parameters of the assumed distributions based on the residuals obtained 
from Step 1. 
For Step 1, as for the DEA, a cost frontier is used, and the CNLS optimization problem 
for period ݐ can be presented as 
 
 
                minఊ,ఉ,ఌ ∑ ሺߝ௜
௧ሻଶே௜ୀଵ  
                s.t. 
            ݈݊ ݔ௜௧ ൌ ݈݊ ߛ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                                 ݅ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊     
ߛ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜௧ ൅ ሺࢼ௜௧ሻᇱ࢟௜௧ ൒ ߙ௛௧ ൅ ሺࢼ௛௧ ሻᇱ࢟௜௧                ݄ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊; ݅ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊    (20) 
                ࢼ௜௧ ൒ 0                                                               	݅ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊ 
In Model (20), ߛ௜௧ is the CNLS estimator of the total cost of producing	࢟௜௧ in period ݐ, 
the intercept	ߙ௜௧ of firm ݅ in period ݐ indicates its local returns to scale status (ߙ௜௧ ൐ 0 
and ߙ௜௧ ൏ 0  represent DRS and IRS, respectively), and  ࢼ௜௧  is the marginal cost of 
outputs. The first constraint in (20) is the regression equation, and the second and third 
constraint ensures convexity and monotonicity, respectively. Model (20) has no sign 
restrictions on the intercept term ߙ௜௧, which implies that we allow variable returns to 
scale (VRS). By imposing the constraint ߙ௜௧ ൌ 0 for all ݅ ൌ 1,⋯ , ݊, we can implement 
the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS). 
Under assumptions of half-normal inefficiency and normal noise we can obtain, in Step 
2, the inefficiency and noise parameters using the method of moments (Aigner et al., 
1997). The estimates of the standard deviation for inefficiency and noise, respectively, 
are 
ߪො௨௧ ൌ ඨ
ெ෡య೟
ቆටమഏቇቂ
ర
ഏିଵቃ
య ,			and																																																											 (21) 
ߪො௩௧ ൌ ටܯ෡ଶ௧ െ ቂగିଶగ ቃ ሺߪො௨௧ሻଶ
మ ,                                                 (22) 
where ܯ෡ଶ௧  and ܯ෡ଷ௧  are the second and third central moments of the composite errors 
from the solution of (20). They are  
ܯ෡ଶ௧ ൌ ∑ ሺߝ௜̂௧ െ ߝ௧̅ሻଶ/݊௡௜ୀଵ , and                                            (23) 
ܯ෡ଷ௧ ൌ ∑ ሺߝ௜̂௧ െ ߝ௧̅ሻଷ/݊௡௜ୀଵ .                                                    (24) 
Hence, the estimator of the best practice cost frontier for a given company ݅ for period 
ݐ is given by 
ܥመ௜௧ሺ࢟௜௧ሻ ൌ ߛ௜௧ሺ࢟௜௧ሻ ∙ exp ቆെߪො௨௧ටଶగቇ,                                            (25) 
 
 
where ߛ௜௧ሺ࢟௜௧ሻ is the average-practice cost frontier (Kuosmanen and Kortelainen, 2012). 
I.e., the best practice cost frontier is given by the average practice cost frontier and the 
standard deviation of the inefficiency term.  
According to Kuosmanen et al. (2013), the estimated cost norm can also be calculated 
as 
ߛ௜௧ሺ࢟௜௧ሻ ൌ max௛ ሺߙ௛
௧ ൅ ሺࢼࢎ࢚ ሻᇱ࢟௜௧ሻ.                                              (26) 
Adjacent-period estimated cost norms using period ݐ or ݐ ൅ 1 data and period ݐ ൅ 1 or 
ݐ technology are 
ߛ௜௧ାଵሺ࢟௜௧ሻ ൌ max௛ ቀߙ௛
௧ାଵ ൅ ൫ࢼࢎ࢚ା૚൯ᇱ࢟௜௧ቁ, and                               (27) 
ߛ௜௧ሺ࢟௜௧ାଵሻ ൌ max௛ ሺߙ௛
௧ ൅ ሺࢼࢎ࢚ ሻᇱ࢟௜௧ାଵሻ	.                                          (28) 
The efficiency score is defined as the ratio of the minimum cost to the observed cost, 
i.e.  
ܧ௜௧ሺ࢟௜௧, ݔ௜௧ሻ ൌ ஼መ೔
೟൫࢟೔೟൯
௫೔೟
                                                                         (29) 
for company ݅  in period ݐ , and ܧ௜௧ାଵሺ࢟௜௧ାଵ, ݔ௜௧ାଵሻ  can be obtained in an analogous 
manner. Based on Equations (25) and (29), we have 
ܧ௜௧ାଵሺ࢟௜௧, ݔ௜௧ሻ ൌ ஼መ೔
೟శభ൫࢟೔೟൯
࢞೔೟
ൌ ఊ೔೟శభ൫࢟೔೟൯∙ୣ୶୮൫ିఙෝೠ೟శభඥଶ/గ൯௫೔೟ , and                     (30) 
ܧ௜௧ሺ࢟௜௧ାଵ, ݔ௜௧ାଵሻ ൌ ஼መ೔
೟൫࢟೔೟శభ൯
࢞೔೟శభ
ൌ ఊ೔೟൫࢟೔೟శభ൯∙ୣ୶୮൫ିఙෝೠ೟ඥଶ/గ൯௫೔೟శభ .                               (31) 
In line with Section 3.1, the Malmquist productivity index based on the StoNED 
approach is defined as 
ܯܲܫ௜௦௧௢௡௘ௗሺ࢟௜௧, ࢟௜௧ାଵ, ݔ௜௧, ݔ௜௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܧܥ௜௦௧௢௡௘ௗ ⋅ ܶܥ௜௦௧௢௡௘ௗ ⋅ ܵܧܥ௜௦௧௢௡௘ௗ,                       (32) 
where  
ܧܥ௜௦௧௢௡௘ௗሺ࢟௜௧, ࢟௜௧ାଵ, ݔ௜௧, ݔ௜௧ାଵሻ ൌ ா೔,ೡೝೞ
೟శభ ൫࢟೔೟శభ,௫೔೟శభ൯
ா೔,ೡೝೞ೟,ೞ೟೚೙೐೏൫࢟೔೟,࢞೔೟൯
,	                                                    (33)   
ܶܥ௜௦௧௢௡௘ௗሺ࢟௜௧, ࢟௜௧ାଵ, ݔ௜௧, ݔ௜௧ାଵሻ ൌ ൤ ா೔,ೡೝೞ
೟ ൫࢟೔೟శభ,௫೔೟శభ൯
ா೔,ೡೝೞ೟శభ,ೞ೟೚೙೐೏൫࢟೔೟శభ,௫೔೟శభ൯
ா೔,ೡೝೞ೟ ൫࢟೔೟,௫೔೟൯
ா೔,ೡೝೞ೟శభ,ೞ೟೚೙೐೏൫࢟೔೟,௫೔೟൯
൨
భ
మ,               (34)                  
 
 
ܵܧܥ௜௦௧௢௡௘ௗሺ࢟௜௧, ࢟௜௧ାଵ, ݔ௜௧, ݔ௜௧ାଵሻ ൌ ൦
ಶ೔,೎ೝೞ೟ ቀ࢟೔೟శభ,ೣ೔೟శభቁ
ಶ೔,ೡೝೞ೟ ቀ࢟೔೟శభ,ೣ೔೟శభቁ
ಶ೔,೎ೝೞ೟ ቀ࢟೔೟,ೣ೔೟ቁ
ಶ೔,ೡೝೞ೟ ቀ࢟೔೟,ೣ೔೟ቁ
ಶ೔,೎ೝೞ೟శభ ቀ࢟೔೟శభ,ೣ೔೟శభቁ
ಶ೔,ೡೝೞ೟శభ ቀ࢟೔೟శభ,ೣ೔೟శభቁ
ಶ೔,೎ೝೞ೟శభ ቀ࢟೔೟,ೣ೔೟ቁ
ಶ೔,ೡೝೞ೟శభ ቀ࢟೔೟,ೣ೔೟ቁ
൪
భ
మ
.                       (35) 
4 Data 
The data for the Malmquist analyses is collected by the Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). It covers 121 Norwegian distribution 
companies for the period 2004-2013. The variables in our data correspond to the 
variables used by the regulator in the benchmarking model that was implemented 
from 2007, i.e., it has a single input, five outputs and three environmental factors, 
as described in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Table 1 Inputs, outputs, and environmental variables. 
Variable Type Sub-variable Unit 
Total cost ݔ 
Operations and maintenance cost 
(Opex) 1000 Norwegian kroner (NOK) 
Value of lost load (quality cost) 
(Voll) 1000 NOK 
Thermal power losses (Losses) 1000 NOK 
Capital depreciation (Capex) 1000 NOK 
Return on capital (Capex) 1000 NOK 
High voltage lines ݕ    Kilometers 
Network stations (transformers) ݕ    No. of stations 
Customers ݕ    No. of customers 
Distance to road ݖ    Kilometers 
HV underground ݖ   Share of HV network (0-1) 
Forest ݖ   Share of HV lines affected (0-1) 
Geol ݖ 
Small scale hydro Installed capacity (MW)/cost norm3 
Average slope Degrees (0-90) 
Deciduous forest Share of HV lines affected (0-1) 
Geo2 ݖ 
Wind/dist.to coast ሺ݉/ݏሻଶ/݉ 
Islands No. of islands /cost norm 
HV sea cables Share of HV network (0-1) 
 
                                                 
3 This variable is divided by the company’s cost norm in order to ensure that the resulting variable 
is size independent. The cost norm is based on five-year average of inputs and outputs. 
 
 
 
 
Total cost is the single input, and it contains the five cost elements that are listed in 
Table 1. Most of the companies also own and operate part of the regional distribution 
network, and NVE reallocates part of this cost to the local distribution activity. This 
reallocation of cost is not included in our study, and our results may therefore differ 
slightly from the efficiency measurements published by NVE. The data for all years 
have been adjusted to the price level of a base year (2013). We use an industry-specific 
price index for adjusting operations and maintenance costs and the consumer price 
index for the VOLL costs. Thermal losses are valued at the average system price at 
Nord Pool for the base year (300 NOK/MWh). Capital depreciation is based on 
reported (nominal) book values, and the return on capital is calculated using the 
nominal rate of return set by the regulator for the base year (7.12 %). Book values and 
depreciation have also been adjusted for inflation. The growth in capital and 
depreciation values over time depends on historical inflation as well as past 
development in investments. Since we do not have detailed data about historical 
investment on company level, we have chosen to adjust capital values and depreciation 
by 2 % per year. This corresponds, approximately, to the average inflation since the 
book values was established in the beginning of the 1990s, following the deregulation 
of the Norwegian power market. We have made analyses to verify that our results are 
not very sensitive to this choice. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of variables. 
Variables Mean Min. Median Max. Sd.dev 
Total cost  108000.00 8884.00 39220.00 1771000.00 215719.80 
High voltage lines 803.10 50.00 321.50 8744.00 1329.81 
Network stations(transformers) 1012.00 52.00 367.00 13530.00 1888.21 
Customers   22670.00 947.00 6428.00 570200.00 58710.64 
Distance to road   226.00 70.37 142.90 1056.00 207.34 
HV underground 0.34 0.06 0.31 0.86 0.18 
Forest  0.12 0.00 0.12 0.39 0.10 
Geol  0.02 -2.06 -0.43 4.72 1.49 
Geo2 0.01 -0.64 -0.45 11.86 1.52 
The outputs are shown in the second part of Table 1 and include high voltage lines, 
network stations and customers. High voltage lines and network stations represent 
structural and environmental conditions which may affect required network size 
and thereby the cost level of the companies. The last part of Table 1 shows 
 
 
environmental variables. The environmental variables affect the performance of 
the companies, but they are out of the companies’ control (Coelli et al., 2005). 
Figure 1 shows the development of the different cost elements over time. Total cost 
decreased in the period from 2004 to 2007, and thereafter it increased, except for the 
years 2010 and 2012. We see that the decrease from 2004 to 2007, as well as the 
decreases in 2010 and 2012, are due variation in the OPEX level, while the CAPEX 
level has increased steadily over the entire period.   
 
Figure 1 Development of cost elements over time (1000 000 NOK). 
5 Results 
5.1 Productivity change and its causes 
The results of our analyses are summarized in Table 3. The table shows estimated 
productivity indices (MPI), efficiency change (EC), technical change (TC), and scale 
efficiency change (SEC) for the periods 2004/07, 2007/10, and 2010/13, as well as for 
2004/13. The estimates for multi-year periods are obtained by taking geometric 
averages of the annual estimates. Index values greater (less) than unity indicates 
improvement (regress).  
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Table 3 Average productivity indices and their decompositions. 
Periods DEA SFA StoNED MPI EC TC SEC MPI EC TC SEC MPI EC TC SEC 
2004/07 1.0146 0.9917 1.0230 1.0011 1.0034 1.0122 0.9940 0.9973 1.0147 1.0063 1.0077 1.0007
2007/10 0.9944 1.0057 0.9905 1.0003 0.9899 0.9998 0.9926 0.9974 0.9948 0.9984 0.9961 1.0002
2010/13 0.9773 1.0120 0.9665 1.0006 0.9830 0.9948 0.9910 0.9970 0.9777 1.0071 0.9700 1.0006
2004/13 0.9954 1.0031 0.9931 1.0007 0.9832 0.9971 0.9892 0.9968 0.9956 1.0039 0.9911 1.0005
Table 3 shows that the overall productivity change for the industry between 2004 and 
2013 has been negative, with estimates of the decline from 0.44% to 1.68%. All three 
methods indicate productivity improvement for 2004/07, i.e., consistent with Migueís 
et al. (2010), while productivity is decreasing in the later periods. We also observe that 
the magnitudes of the productivity changes for the sub-periods are very similar for 
DEA and StoNED. The decrease in productivity in the later periods is somewhat 
surprising, since the efficiency incentives in the regulatory scheme should be 
strengthened with the introduction of yardstick regulation, with annual benchmarking 
to update cost norms, from 2007. We discuss this further in Section 5.2. The top part of 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of productivity change among the companies in the 
industry. We see again that the two non-parametric methods yield very similar 
distributions, while the distributions for SFA are narrower. 
We see from Table 3 that all three methods agree that technological change for the 
industry has been negative between 2004 and 2013, with estimates of the average 
annual decline ranging from 0.69% to 1.08%. Table 3 and Figure 2 show that DEA and 
StoNED agree on the direction of technological change for the sub-periods, but that 
these methods differ somewhat with respect to the magnitude of their estimates. Both 
methods agree that the average technological change is positive for 2004/07, and 
thereafter becomes negative. Note that the TC estimates in StoNED depend on the 
distributional assumptions made, as shown in Cheng et al. (2015). When the observed 
skewness in StoNED under the VRS assumption for a given year is negative, the 
technical change estimates will, somewhat arbitrarily, be based on the average-practice 
frontier for the year in question. We see from Table 4 that this occurred for 4 of the 10 
years. The SFA results indicate, on average, negative technological change for all three 
periods. Also, as for overall productivity change, the distributions of technological 
changes are narrower in the case of SFA than for the other two methods.  
 
 
Table 4 Estimated skewness in StoNED under the VRS assumption. 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0001 
Figure 2 shows that the shapes of the efficiency change distributions are quite similar 
under DEA and StoNED, although their levels differ in some cases. We note again that 
some of the StoNED frontier estimates are based on the average-practice frontier, as 
implied by the negative skewness estimates in Table 4. As discussed in Cheng et al. 
(2015), using the average-practice frontier for doing efficiency change estimates will 
result in values close to unity. Table 3 shows, indeed, that the StoNED efficiency 
change estimates deviates less from unity than the corresponding DEA estimates. The 
efficiency change distributions for SFA in Figure 2 are, as for productivity change and 
technological change, narrower than the corresponding distributions for DEA and 
StoNED, and the levels of the industry estimates in Table 3 do not agree with those for 
the non-parametric methods.  
As both Table 3 and Figure 2 show, the estimates of scale efficiency indices are very 
close to unity for all methods and sub-periods. This is not surprising, since the industry 
structure is constant in our data set, which consists of a balanced sample of 121 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Distributions of MPI, EC, TC, and SEC
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5.2 Effect of capital costs 
In the previous section, we observed that the estimated productivity change was negative 
for the entire period between 2004 and 2013. A more detailed analysis showed productivity 
growth for 2004/07, and decline thereafter. This is surprising, since the efficiency 
incentives in the regulation scheme were strengthened from 2007, as mentioned above. 
However, there are indications that the introduction of the new regulation mechanism 
coincided with the start of a new investment cycle, as witnessed by the increase in capital 
costs shown in Figure 1. Eurelectric (2014) states that the investments in Norwegian 
distribution networks were quite low from about 1988 until 2006, and that the investments 
thereafter started to grow. The projected level of investments in 2017 is two times the level 
in 2010. The increase is, according to Eurelectric (2014), due to rapid growth of distributed 
generation, the overall network condition, increasing consumption and the roll-out of smart 
meters planned until 2019. Since we use accounting values based on linear depreciation, to 
represent capital costs in our analysis, increased investments will automatically lead to 
higher capital costs and lower productivity, although this may not reflect a real productivity 
decline. 
Table 5 Average productivity indices and their decompositions when CAPEX is left out. 
Periods DEA SFA StoNED MPI EC TC SEC MPI EC TC SEC MPI EC TC SEC 
2004/07 1.0256 1.0046 1.0217 1.0013 1.0023 1.0000 1.0057 0.9966 1.0253 1.0053 1.0188 1.0008
2007/10 1.0038 1.0147 1.0033 1.0008 0.9871 1.0000 0.9906 0.9965 1.0039 1.0059 0.9972 1.0005
2010/13 0.9671 1.0119 0.9577 1.0007 0.9726 1.0000 0.9760 0.9965 0.9675 1.0071 0.9592 1.0010
2004/13 0.9986 1.0104 0.9939 1.0009 0.9873 1.0000 0.9907 0.9969 0.9986 1.0061 0.9914 1.0008
 
Table 6 The effect of leaving out CAPEX. 
Periods DEA SFA StoNED MPI EC TC SEC MPI EC TC SEC MPI EC TC SEC 
2004/07 0.0110 0.0130 -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0122 0.0117 -0.0006 0.0106 -0.0009 0.0111 0.0001
2007/10 0.0094 0.0090 0.0127 0.0005 0.0039 0.0002 -0.0020 -0.0009 0.0090 0.0075 0.0011 0.0003
2010/13 -0.0102 -0.0001 -0.0088 0.0001 -0.0087 0.0052 -0.0151 -0.0005 -0.0102 0.0000 -0.0108 0.0004
2004/13 0.0032 0.0073 0.0008 0.0002 0.0040 0.0029 0.0014 0.0001 0.0030 0.0022 0.0003 0.0002
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Estimated skewness in StoNED/VRS when CAPEX is left out. 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
-0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0015 0.0004 
Given the combination of investment cycles and the use of accounting-based capital values 
in our analysis, we find it natural to repeat our analysis with cost estimates that do not 
include capital costs, and the results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 shows average 
estimates, as in Table 3, and Table 6 shows the effect of leaving out CAPEX, i.e., the 
difference between the values in Tables 5 and 3. For the entire period from 2004 to 2013, 
we observe a positive effect on overall productivity growth between 0.3 % and 0.4 % for all 
methods. Also, the average estimates of all the sub-indices increase when capital is 
excluded from the analysis. However, overall productivity change remains negative also 
when we exclude capital costs. After this change, DEA and StoNED agree on an average 
productivity decline of 0.14 % per year from 2004 to 2013, while the average productivity 
decline for SFA is estimated to 1.27 % per year.  
As shown in Section 3.4, the efficiency change estimates under SFA are based on changes 
in short-run inefficiency. If the estimated short-run inefficiency scores are zero, as in our 
case, then the EC estimates will be equal to one. The estimated company efficiency scores 
will be constant over time. Interestingly, Table 7 shows that the estimated skewness values 
in StoNED are negative for 8 of 10 years. For pair of consecutive years where estimated 
skewness is negative, the StoNED estimate of efficiency change will be based on the 
average-practice frontier, as discussed in Section 5.1, and this also tends to give EC 
estimates close to unity. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
We have investigated the productivity development for Norwegian electricity 
distribution companies for 2004-2013. Using three benchmarking methods, DEA, 
SFA, and StoNED, on a Malmquist productivity index framework, we examine 
productivity change, with the usual decompositions into efficiency change, technical 
change, and scale efficiency change. For the period as a whole, all three approaches 
agree that productivity has declined, and that there has been technological regress. 
However, the methods do not fully agree on the direction of efficiency change. Scale 
efficiency changes are very small. A priori, we would expect to see improvement in 
productivity following the new regulation regime from 2007, but our analysis do not 
support this. We have repeated the analysis with cost values excluding capital costs, 
to control for a suspected bias due to increasing investments/capital values. This has a 
positive effect on productivity change and its decompositions, but the overall 
impression of negative productivity change and technological regress is not altered. 
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